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The purpose of this article is twofold: to determine the specific
areas of relationship between law and morality; and to demonstrate
(philosophically and pragmatically) that a complete dichotomy between
law and morality is unsound. The classic advocate of a complete divorce
of law and morality in American Jurisprudence is Mr. Justice Oliver
W. Holmes. In his noted address to law students, Justice Holmes stated
that a law student could gain a more perspicacious understanding of
law if he would view the law from a "bad man's" point of view and
thereby recognize a dichotomy between law and morality.' Holmes'
purported motive was to achieve an understanding of law in terms of
scope and content by emphasizing the idea that morality should not be
equated with the contents of law because morality, per se, has no
objective validity and moral terms, as used in law, lose their ethical
meaning.2 Elsewhere, considering law in terms of source, Holmes
argued that the moral judgment of society (changing mores) is the
ultimate source of law,3 rejected the doctrine of the natural law,4
termed morality "a body of imperfect social generalizations expressed in
terms of emotion."'5 He defines law as "a statement of the circumstances
in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the
courts.""
The procedure of this article will be to analyze the concept of law
and morality; determine the specific areas of their relationship; and to
determine the effect of this relationship.
CONCEPT OF LAw
Every society comes into being for some purpose, i.e., a society is a
unity of order determined by its last end and goal,7 and different
3. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, The Path of Law 169 (1920).
2 Ibid., 170: "I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what
I have to say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness and ex-
ternal deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral develop-
ment of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make
good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law
and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and under-
standing the law." Cf. 64 HARv. L. Rrv. 529, 929 (1951); 37 A.B.A. J. 809
(1951).3 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 44 (1881): "--the rules of law are or should be
based upon a morality which is generally accepted."
4 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, The Natural Law, 312 (1920) : "The jurists
who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that
accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them, as something that must
be accepted by all men every where."
5 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, Ideals and Doubts, 306 (1920).
6 American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1908). Cf. The
Path of Law, 173: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact. and noth-
ing more pretentious ,are what I mean by the law."
7 Cf. De regimine principum ad regein Cypri, I, 15.
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societies are classified according to their different ends.8 Thus societies
are necessitated by the dignities and needs of the person: hono homini
ainicus.9 But while society is a necessity, the form of the polity is left
to man's free determination. Consequently, there is an essential rela-
tionship between political society and man's nature and purpose; and
only in the order of the community can the individual welfare be secure.
Laws are essential in any society because they are necessary means to
attain the end of the State, and the goal to which all laws aim is the
common good, i.e., the attainment of the end for which a society exists.
In most societies, this goal is that of affording the individual an oppor-
tunity to live a full life. Hence, the immediate common good of a state
is peace, while the ultimate common good of the state is the life of
reason for the whole community,'0 i.e., the assurance of the opportunity
to follow the law of reason to individual perfection. 1 It should be
noted that the common good is not superior to the private good in a
quantitative sense but rather differs and is superior in a formal sense, 2
i.e., a common good, as such, is communicable, while a private good
is not.
The term "law" itself is complex and subject to many distinctions,
but complexities necessitate distinctions and distinctions are the strings
of understanding winding through the labyrinth of human affairs. All
of the characteristics of law, in its generic sense, are contained in the
classic definition: "Law is an ordination of reason for the common good
by him who has care of the community and promulgated.' 3 Because
the types of law differ in their casuality, it can be seen that the term
"law" is predicated analogously and not univocally of the types of law :4
eternal, natural, 5 divine and positive; i.e., the term law is used in a
variety of meanings having an essential similarity of meanings and not
s Sumna Theologica, I, q. 11, a. 2.
9 Contra Gentiles, III, 117, 125.
10 Cf. JACQUES MARrrAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMoN GooD, 42.
11 In Quaestiones Disputatae de Caritate, a. 2, c: "The good of man is to be under-
stood diversely, according as man is understood diversely. For the proper
good of man as man is the good of reason, since to be man is to be rational.
The good of man as an artist is the good of art, and so also according as he is
a citizen, his good is the common good of the city."
12 Cf. Sun'na Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 7.
13 Sunmma Theol., I-II, q. 90, a. 4.
14 M. T. ADLER, A Question About Law in ESSAY IN THoMIsma.
15 A distinction should be noted in natural law-namely, natural physical law and
natural moral law. Natural law is the participation by things in the Eternal Law
in which each thing is directed according to its nature. This participation will be
commensurate with the nature of the thing: passive or active. If passive, as in
non-rational beings, it will follow necessary physical laws; but natural physical
laws as known to man are merely scientific hypothesis attempting to explain
phenomena and are thus "laws" by equivocation. Cf. W. H. WERKMEISTER, A
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. If active, as in rational creatures, whose natures are




as having one meaning only, because the sources and applications differ.
The natural law,16 in the order of the common good, prescribes the end
of justice and the jus gentuim' 7 which (approximates international law)
prescribes the means of justice-but both constitute the end and means
in a universal sense and hence there exists a need for a norm or law on
the particular and practical order of concrete acts: the positive law.
Thus positive law declares and supplements 8 natural law by more
definite determinations and its chief function is to implement natural
law in different civilizations and cultures. However, positive law is
subject to error because it treats the contingent rather than the neces-
sary; and therefore, since the matter of positive law is mostly determi-
nation and hence -opinion, positive law may, per accidens, be contrary
to the common good, yet, per se, it is directed to the common good.
CONCEPT OF MOiLITY
Morality may be equated with order and has as its object human
actions that are ordered to one another and to some end. The idea of
value (good or end) is the crux of any moral system since the concept
of value is a primary concept in the order of our practical concepts, i.e.,
ultimate in its genus.' 9 The value of anything rests primarily in its per-
fection and in its act, i.e., in the full development of its peculiar nature
and the attainment of its own peculiar perfection. Hence the concept
of value is the beginning of morality, a thing takes on the appearance of
an end because it is good and the end is the form which a th:ng assumes
when it enters into relation with an appetite. Therefore, the reason why
an object becomes the object of an appetite lies in its goodness and
value,20 and every appetite is directed towards the perfection of the
subject. Hence the moral act is a combination of the subject that makes
the act (rational and free act) and the object that is intended (objective
goods and values that result from this activity) ; objectively the moral
act is made up of three elements-the object, the end and the circum-
stance.2' The moral act derives its quality from its agreement with some
16 Cf. J. Maritain, The Natural Law, Commonweal, May 15, 1942, p. 84-"This
means that there exists, by the very reason of human nature, an order or a
pattern which human nature can discover and according to which the human
will must act in order to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human
being." RYAN AND BOLAND, CATHOLIC PRhCIPLES OF PoLIncs 4 (1941): "The
natural law may be defined as: a necessary rule of action, determined by ra-
tional nature, imposed by God as author of nature, and perceived intuitively."
NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 1-4 (1950).
I7 9 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, 73, 76 (1910).
Is Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 95, a. 2. The modes of derivation from the natural
law found in the human law are declarative (derived from the common prin-
ciples of the natural law by way of conclusions-i.e., declaratory of natural
law) and determinative (derived from the natural law by way of determina-
tion).
19 1 Ethica Nicornachea, 1, 1094a.2o Scmnma Theol., I-II, q. 8, a. 1.21 De Malo, II, 4, ad 11.
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norm and since man has the seal of Divine Intelligence inscribed on "his
heart" in the form of general principles of action by which the ends of
his strivings are measured,22 then the proximate norm will be human
reason and the ultimate norm will be the eternal law. Therefore rational
human nature is the norm of morality, and morality is the transforma-
tion of a known order of values. To put it quite succinctly, morality is
nothing more than conformity with the rule which regulates human
life: namely, the rule of reason. Thus the essence of morality is man's
approach to his goal; man's particular goal is the perfection of his
spiritual and moral nature and his ultimate goal is union with God.
CONCLUSIONS AS TO SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIP
The precise areas of relationship between law and morality can be
stated in the following manner:
1) Law is related to morality in the setting forth of those virtues
that are related to the common good. This does not mean that positive
human law should prohibit all vices nor command all virtues: rather it
prohibits only the grosser failings of mankind which threaten the very
survival of society and commands those virtues which can be ordained
by human means to the common good. 23
2) Law is related to morality by the moral obligation imposed, i.e.,
by the necessity of an act in relation to a necessary end-since law as
the command of practical reason necessarily implies an obligation. Thus
obligation flows from the essential notion of law as an effective dictate
of practical reason, i.e., a connection of some necessity between the act
commanded and the end for which that act is commanded. However,
positive human laws' obligation is not in that same manner as morality's
obligation.24
3) Law is related to morality inasmuch as law is subject to and
cannot contradict moral principles, i.e., natural moral law.25
4) Law is related to morality inasmuch as both stem and are
directed by the same source: practical reason or prudence. A keener
22 Srinma Tleol., I-II, q. 91, a. 2. Cf. Commonweal 36: 83-5, May 15, 1942: "It
is written, some say, in men's hearts. True enough. but in the hidden depths, as
much hidden to us as our very hearts themselves. This very figure of speech has
often been disastrous, leading men to conceive the natural law as a ready made
code neatly packaged in each man's consciousness, and which each as only to
unwrap-and whereof all men should by nature have equal knowledge-Men
know it with greater or less ease, and in different degree, and here, as else-
where, they run the risk of error. The only practical knowledge which all men
naturally and infallibly share in common is that one must do good and avoid
evil.-That every sort of error and aberration should be possible in our de-
termination of these things merely goes to show that our insight is weak and
that innumerable accidents can pervert our judgment."
23 Su nma Theol., I-II, q. 96, a. 3.
24 Sunma Theol., I-II, q. 96, a. 5.
25 Swrmna Theol., I-II, q. 92, a. 1.
[Vol. 36
JURISPRUDENCE
insight into this particular relationship can be ascertained by deter-
mining the nature of politics; politics is a human work of art,2 6 i.e., a
work of experience and prudence-and as prudence, politics is intrin-
sically related to ethics.27
5) Law is related to morality inasmuch as justice is a moral con-
cept which is meaningless outside the area of morality. Essentially,
justice consists in the creation of an equality.2
PRAGMATIC ILLUSTRATIONS
A pragmatic illustration of the specific relationship between law and
morality is found in two areas of law:
1) One example is the problem of the legal effect, in absence of
statute, of homicide upon the title claimed by the slayer as heir, devisee,
or joint tenant to the property of the deceased.2 9 Courts have reached
three different results in solving this question:
a) Some courts held that title (legal or equitable) passes to the
criminal.30
b) Some courts held that no title passes:31
c) Some courts hold that legal title passes but equity will compel the
wrongdoer to hold as a constructive trustee.3 2
The basis for the rule on which courts hold that title passes is
founded on the various statutes of descent and constitutions: no con-
viction should work a corruption of blood nor should property be for-
feited because of a crime. However, in the Ohio case of Deem v.
Milliken,"3 the court pointed out that even if the title passes, yet the
constitutional prohibition would be inapplicable if the court held that no
title vested. The basis for the rule in which courts hold that no title
passes is that the statute of descent did not abrogate the common law
rule that a man cannot benefit from his crime and title never vested,
consequently there is no infringement of constitutional provisions. The
rationale of the constructive trustee doctrine is the equitable principle
which impresses a trust upon the res acquired by a wrongdoer for the
benefit of the injured party.34
The co-tangency of all the specific areas of relationship are involved
in these cases, especially the regulation of certain actions (e.g. murder)
26 Summa Theol, I-II, q. 21, a. 1.
27 Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 9.
28 Suna Theol.. II-II, q. 157, a. 3.
29 Cf. 98 A.L.R. 773; 12 OHIO ST. L. J. 1 (1951).
30 See e.g., Wall vs. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914) ; Welsh vs.
James, 408 Ill. 18, 94 N.E. 2d 872 (1951); Wilson vs. Randolph, 50 Neb. 371,
261 Pac. 654 (1927).
3' See e.g., Garwols vs. Bankers Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239 (1930);
Estate of Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N.W. 652 (1927); In re King's Estate,
261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W. 2d 885 (1952).
32 See e.g., Bryant vs. Bryant; 193 N.C. 372, 127 S.E. 188 (1927).
33 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 N.E. 1134 (1895).
34 Cf. AmES, Lw=rus ON LEGAL HisToRY 310-322 (1913).
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for the common good, the concept of justice, and practical reason.
Murder (the unjustified taking of another's life) is prohibited as a
grosser failing of mankind by law, thus clearly embodying a moral
principle in this specific area of relationship: but more specific determi-
nation of the consequences of this forbidden moral act is contingent on
the concept of justice as interpreted by practical reason calling for a
value judgment-i.e., whether the courts will, in applying the positive
law to this fact situation, further delineate the moral contents of the law
or proceed from this embodied moral principle in a "legalistic form,"
will depend upon the particular courts conception of the doctrine of
judicial objectivity. Thus there is a distinction between a law contain-
ing a moral element and the consideration of this moral element by
courts in reaching their results. Considering the problem exclusively
in the area of morality, the proper moral judgment would be, using. a
joint tenancy as an illustration, that each co-tenant is entitled to his
share of contribution: courts, on the whole, have not reached this result
(see dissent in In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W. 2d 885)
because they have been chary of indulging in value judgments; which
chariness, as illustrated by some of these cases, has resulted in a mani-
fest violation of justice as determined by a known order of values. But
the hesitancy of courts to further refine the moral principles does not
refute their embodiment in the positive law, no more than a mistake in
adding a column of figures refutes mathematics.
2) The second example will be found in the distinction between
positive acts, negative acts, and negative acts where there is an affirm-
ative duty. Thus the basis for affirmative duties in the law of torts is
frequently said to be a benefit principle, i.e., affirmative duties are im-
posed where the actor brings himself into a certain relation with another
from which he expects or obtains benefits:
"The law fastens upon certain social relationships certain cor-
responding responsibilities, and when the relationship is import-
ant enough to require its safeguarding by legal rights and
liabilities, legal duties are attached thereto. Perhaps one of the
most significant factors which has affected the development of
the law here is the element of advantage in the relationship for
the person upon whom affirmative obligations are imposed. No
such duty is imposed except in cases wherein the relationship is
presumably of an advantageous or beneficial natur. ' '
Consequently, legal duties are distinguished from moral duties by
relating both to "benefit" and if there is no "benefit" there is no duty
to act36 Thus:
5 HA"nnR, ToRTs, 197 (1933).
36 Cf. Buch v. Armory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 At. 809 (1898); Hurley v.
Eddinfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) ; Osterland v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73,
160 N.E. 301 (1928) ; Allen v. Hoxson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900).
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"For years there has been a dogma of the books that in the
absence of a special duty of protection, one may stand by with
indifference and see another perish, by drowning, say, or fire,
though there would be no peril in a rescue. A rule so divorced
from morals was sure to breed misgivings. ' 37
But there is an increasing tendency by courts to expand liability for
negative conduct (failure to control) in the area of negative acts by
finding an affirmative duty-i.e., shifting the basis of liability from
what is done (conduct) to what ought to be done (duty). 3s Thus,
bearing in mind the distinction between morality and changing mores,
courts seem to have a propensity to consider those moral duties, which
are related to the common good, as legal duties with a concomitant
liability for their breach.
EFFECT OF RELATIONSHIP
Although there are specific areas of relationship between law and
morality, it does not follow that courts will consider moral elements in
the application of the positive civil law. The-extent of the weight of
moral consideration in the application of the positive law will be con-
tingent upon many factors: particular weight is given to moral con-
siderations in the expansion of legal rights and in the interpretation of
constitutions and statutes.3 9
A curious and rather candid illustration of the weight of moral
consideration in the application of the positive law is found in a story
told by Justice Caton on the way in which the justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court arrived at their decision in Shackleford v. Hall:"
"The testator having devised the estate in his will precisely as
the statute would have cast it in the absence of a will, imposed the
subsequent condition that if either of his children should marry
before attaining the age of twenty-one years, he or she should
forfeit the estate thus bequeathed. Mrs. Shackleford did not'
choose to wait until she was twenty-one years old, and so was
married before that time. Her brother, Henry H. Hall, then filed
a bill to declare the forfeiture, which, upon hearing in the Circuit
Court, was dismissed, and thence was brought to the Supreme
Court. Upon the arguments for the complainant, the plaintiff in
error, the violation of the condition subsequent was relied upon,
and really that was about all he had to say in the opening. For
the defense it was claimed that the condition was in restraint of
marriage, and therefore void; but to this a conclusive answer was
given that a reasonable restraint was not only proper but com-
mendable, and that a restraint to the age of twenty-one years, or
37 CARozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 25 (1928).
38 Cf. Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal R.R., 199 Wis. 575, 227 N.W. 385 (1929);
Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W. 2d 843 (1948); Tamesa v.
United States, 325 U.S. 8W8 (1945); Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
39 Cf. 6 VAND. L. REv. 41 (1952).
40 19 Ill. 212 (1857).
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even a greater age, was not unreasonable, and upon this the case
was submitted. So soon as we reached the conference room with
the record, Breese broke out and said: 'That brother is a mean
fellow; yes, he's a great rascal, and we must beat him if possible.
Now, Caton, how can it be done?' I replied that the law referred
to on the argument was certainly all in his favor, and I didn't
remember any law to controvert that, and judge Walker was
equally at a loss to find any way to get around it. I then stated
that during the argument there semed to be, as if it were floating
in the atmosphere, some intangible, undefined idea that I had
seen something, somewhere, some idea, derived from something
I had read sometime, probably when I was a student, when
reading some text book, that might have some bearing on the
case, but what it was I could not say. It was but a vague, in-
definite impression, and seemed rather like a fleeting dream than
a tangible idea; that I felt confident that I had never seen a case
from which that thought had arisen, and that I felt no assurance
that there was any principle laid down in the books, in any way
qualifying the decisions which seemed to be so directly in point,
holding that this condition subsequent was valid.
"Breese then picked up the record from my desk, placed it in
my hands, and said: 'You take this record and hang on to the
tail of that idea till you follow it up to its head, until you find
some law to beat this unnatural rascal, who would cheat his
sister out of her inheritance just because she wanted to get
married a few months before the time fixed by the old man.'
"I took the record home with me, and after I had finished
writing opinions in all my other cases I took up this. I examined
carefully all the Digests in the library, and went through the
English reports. I sought thoroughly, without finding a single
word bearing in any way upon the case, still believing that there
was something somewhere that would throw some light upon it
on one side or the other. I took down Jarman on Wills, and
went home determined to read every text book in the library on
that subject before I would give up the search, and commenced
reading at the very beginning, and then proceeded very delib-
erately page by page until I had got, perhaps, two-thirds of the
way through the book, when I read a short paragraph which did
not at first attract my attention particularly, and I passed on;
but before I had finished the next paragraph the previous one
began to impress itself upon me, and I looked back and read it
again, and the more I studied it the more I thought it contained
something to the purpose. It referred to several old English
cases, the reference to which I took down, and made my way to
the library as soon as possible, impatient to see what these ref-
erences would develop. In less than an hour, I found the law
to be as well settled as any other well recognized principle of
law, that where a testator devises an estate to his heir accompa-
nied with a condition or forfeiture, a breach of that condition
shall not work the forfeiture, unless its existence is brought home
to the knowledge of the heir, and this rule applies as well to con-
[Vol. 36
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veyances by deed as by devise. I still think it a little remarkable
that these cases, although few and most of them very old, are not
found referred to in any of the Digests which I have consulted,
and that no such case appears ever to have arisen in any of the
courts of the United States, or in later times in England, and it is
probable that today this case stands alone in American reports.
"When I read my opinion at next conference Judge Breese
especially manifested great satisfaction at the result of my in-
vestigations, and walked across the room and patted me on the
back, saying, 'Well done, my good boy,' and seemed not less
pleased at the strictures I had expressed in the latter part of the
opinion upon the conduct of the hard-hearted brother, as he
termed him, and in this expression we all concurred." 41
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, in terms of contents, morality is intrinsically related to law in
specified areas and can be a controlling factor in a specific fact situation.
Consequently, a complete divorce will not make for a better under-
standing and this can be seen by the pragmatic difference it will make
as to which view a lawyer embraces in his practice:
1) He may utilize in his arguments the further recognition or
embodiment of moral principles.
2) He will, assuming a conflict of authorities so that an application
to a specific fact situation will produce different results, be able to utilize
moral principles in his arguments.
3) He may utilize moral principles in constitutional or statutory
construction.
ARTHUR SCHELLER, JR.
4 1 EARLY BEcH AND BAR oF ILLois 200-203, as quoted in KALEs, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS 869 note (2d ed.).
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